• grue@lemmy.world
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    3
    Ā·
    1 month ago

    I feel like there’s at least one historical example of a worm being released that was designed to attack home routers and patch the vulnerability it exploited, but my search is failing.

    Anyway, that’s the sort of tactic you’d need to do what you’re asking.

    • morto@piefed.social
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      1
      Ā·
      1 month ago

      That’s exactly what I’d love to be able to do. Just imagine, a ā€œmereā€ 10% of routers affected would be enough to give a significant reduction in ad revenue to some big corps

      • partofthevoice@lemmy.zip
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        1
        Ā·
        edit-2
        1 month ago

        I think you’re on to something.

        This predatory ad shit works because most people don’t care enough to do something about it. That same cohort of people likely also won’t care enough to fix the ā€œissue.ā€ They’ll hear about it, see their email still works fine and move on with life.

        Edit: could we design something like a community vpn project? Something like… I don’t know… like Tor, but for a completely different purpose? Something you can install and it routes your traffic through globally distributed nodes which automatically filter your traffic to remove ads and other security measures?

        That would keep things opt-in. It would keep control of the system / filtering bound by community interest. We could set up separate filtering systems too — in case that would be required. Users can pick which filter package their traffic is treated with.

        I don’t have a lot of bandwidth, but I definitely have some to spare. I am not using my Internet 24/7.

        Edit 2: to be clear, I don’t really think opt-in is justified here’s though. TheĀ interestingĀ questionĀ isn’tĀ whetherĀ weĀ canĀ blockĀ advertisementsĀ forĀ strangers.Ā It’sĀ whetherĀ weĀ canĀ justifyĀ protectingĀ peopleĀ fromĀ aĀ demonstrablyĀ dangerousĀ infrastructure,Ā evenĀ whenĀ theyĀ haven’tĀ requestedĀ thatĀ protection.

        ConsiderĀ threeĀ premises:

        1. AnĀ infrastructureĀ exposesĀ peopleĀ toĀ harmsĀ theyĀ generallyĀ don’tĀ understandĀ orĀ meaningfullyĀ consentĀ to.
        2. AĀ thirdĀ partyĀ possessesĀ aĀ mechanismĀ thatĀ canĀ reduceĀ thoseĀ harmsĀ withoutĀ requiringĀ individualĀ participation.
        3. TheĀ interventionĀ introducesĀ substantiallyĀ lessĀ riskĀ thanĀ itĀ prevents.

        IĀ don’tĀ thinkĀ requiringĀ explicit,Ā individualizedĀ consentĀ isĀ automaticallyĀ theĀ mostĀ defensibleĀ ethicalĀ position. WeĀ alreadyĀ acceptĀ similarĀ arrangementsĀ inĀ cybersecurity.

        EmailĀ providersĀ filterĀ maliciousĀ attachmentsĀ withoutĀ askingĀ recipientsĀ aboutĀ eachĀ one.Ā NetworkĀ administratorsĀ blockĀ connectionsĀ toĀ maliciousĀ destinations.Ā BrowsersĀ preventĀ knownĀ dangerousĀ downloads.

        TheĀ importantĀ precedentĀ isĀ thatĀ protectiveĀ defaultsĀ canĀ beĀ justifiedĀ withoutĀ affirmativeĀ consentĀ forĀ everyĀ individualĀ intervention.

        However,Ā thoseĀ examplesĀ involveĀ servicesĀ orĀ systemsĀ withĀ anĀ establishedĀ responsibilityĀ forĀ protectingĀ theirĀ users. Therefore I think our approach should be similarly designed. AĀ strangerĀ modifyingĀ somebodyĀ else’sĀ communicationsĀ hasĀ noĀ comparableĀ authority.

        SilentlyĀ installingĀ protectiveĀ softwareĀ throughĀ advertisingĀ exploits is theoreticallyĀ conceivable,Ā butĀ itĀ wouldĀ reproduceĀ theĀ sameĀ unauthorizedĀ device-compromiseĀ problemĀ we’reĀ tryingĀ toĀ eliminate. I would be cautious about this — what if your infrastructure can itself because a centralized attack surface?

        I also wonder about what methods can target ad infrastructure directly, though. That’s another approach.