I feel like thereās at least one historical example of a worm being released that was designed to attack home routers and patch the vulnerability it exploited, but my search is failing.
Anyway, thatās the sort of tactic youād need to do what youāre asking.
Thatās exactly what Iād love to be able to do. Just imagine, a āmereā 10% of routers affected would be enough to give a significant reduction in ad revenue to some big corps
This predatory ad shit works because most people donāt care enough to do something about it. That same cohort of people likely also wonāt care enough to fix the āissue.ā Theyāll hear about it, see their email still works fine and move on with life.
Edit: could we design something like a community vpn project? Something like⦠I donāt know⦠like Tor, but for a completely different purpose? Something you can install and it routes your traffic through globally distributed nodes which automatically filter your traffic to remove ads and other security measures?
That would keep things opt-in. It would keep control of the system / filtering bound by community interest. We could set up separate filtering systems too ā in case that would be required. Users can pick which filter package their traffic is treated with.
I donāt have a lot of bandwidth, but I definitely have some to spare. I am not using my Internet 24/7.
SilentlyĀ installingĀ protectiveĀ softwareĀ throughĀ advertisingĀ exploits is theoreticallyĀ conceivable,Ā butĀ itĀ wouldĀ reproduceĀ theĀ sameĀ unauthorizedĀ device-compromiseĀ problemĀ weāreĀ tryingĀ toĀ eliminate. I would be cautious about this ā what if your infrastructure can itself because a centralized attack surface?
I also wonder about what methods can target ad infrastructure directly, though. Thatās another approach.
I feel like thereās at least one historical example of a worm being released that was designed to attack home routers and patch the vulnerability it exploited, but my search is failing.
Anyway, thatās the sort of tactic youād need to do what youāre asking.
Thatās exactly what Iād love to be able to do. Just imagine, a āmereā 10% of routers affected would be enough to give a significant reduction in ad revenue to some big corps
I think youāre on to something.
This predatory ad shit works because most people donāt care enough to do something about it. That same cohort of people likely also wonāt care enough to fix the āissue.ā Theyāll hear about it, see their email still works fine and move on with life.
Edit: could we design something like a community vpn project? Something like⦠I donāt know⦠like Tor, but for a completely different purpose? Something you can install and it routes your traffic through globally distributed nodes which automatically filter your traffic to remove ads and other security measures?
That would keep things opt-in. It would keep control of the system / filtering bound by community interest. We could set up separate filtering systems too ā in case that would be required. Users can pick which filter package their traffic is treated with.
I donāt have a lot of bandwidth, but I definitely have some to spare. I am not using my Internet 24/7.
Edit 2: to be clear, I donāt really think opt-in is justified hereās though. TheĀ interestingĀ questionĀ isnātĀ whetherĀ weĀ canĀ blockĀ advertisementsĀ forĀ strangers.Ā ItāsĀ whetherĀ weĀ canĀ justifyĀ protectingĀ peopleĀ fromĀ aĀ demonstrablyĀ dangerousĀ infrastructure,Ā evenĀ whenĀ theyĀ havenātĀ requestedĀ thatĀ protection.
ConsiderĀ threeĀ premises:
IĀ donātĀ thinkĀ requiringĀ explicit,Ā individualizedĀ consentĀ isĀ automaticallyĀ theĀ mostĀ defensibleĀ ethicalĀ position. WeĀ alreadyĀ acceptĀ similarĀ arrangementsĀ inĀ cybersecurity.
EmailĀ providersĀ filterĀ maliciousĀ attachmentsĀ withoutĀ askingĀ recipientsĀ aboutĀ eachĀ one.Ā NetworkĀ administratorsĀ blockĀ connectionsĀ toĀ maliciousĀ destinations.Ā BrowsersĀ preventĀ knownĀ dangerousĀ downloads.
TheĀ importantĀ precedentĀ isĀ thatĀ protectiveĀ defaultsĀ canĀ beĀ justifiedĀ withoutĀ affirmativeĀ consentĀ forĀ everyĀ individualĀ intervention.
However,Ā thoseĀ examplesĀ involveĀ servicesĀ orĀ systemsĀ withĀ anĀ establishedĀ responsibilityĀ forĀ protectingĀ theirĀ users. Therefore I think our approach should be similarly designed. AĀ strangerĀ modifyingĀ somebodyĀ elseāsĀ communicationsĀ hasĀ noĀ comparableĀ authority.
SilentlyĀ installingĀ protectiveĀ softwareĀ throughĀ advertisingĀ exploits is theoreticallyĀ conceivable,Ā butĀ itĀ wouldĀ reproduceĀ theĀ sameĀ unauthorizedĀ device-compromiseĀ problemĀ weāreĀ tryingĀ toĀ eliminate. I would be cautious about this ā what if your infrastructure can itself because a centralized attack surface?
I also wonder about what methods can target ad infrastructure directly, though. Thatās another approach.