After more than 100 days of fighting Hamas [read: exterminating Palestinians], one phenomenon that is not receiving sufficient public attention is the enormous, ongoing burden carried by the combat soldiers.

In some combat units, the number of soldiers who have pulled out due to mental issues is higher than or equal to the number of soldiers who were wounded in battle.

The war in the Gaza Strip is different from anything the [Occupation] Forces has experienced, even though Hamas is a weaker adversary than most Arab armies [Zionism] was pitted against in previous wars.

In many senses, the army and its soldiers have not faced such a burden since the First Lebanon War in 1982. That war did not begin with such a great shock stemming from such a large-scale failure, as the present war did.

The present confrontation is unusual in its relatively high number of casualties, in the nature of combat – which is taking place in densely populated areas, some of it conducted underground – as well as in the horrors of this war, with stories of captivity and abuse committed against hostages by Hamas and the killing and destruction left in the wake of the IDF’s ground maneuvers.

Brigade and division commanders – who have been giving many interviews – are right in saying that according to all the testimony, conscript and reserve soldiers have been fighting well, courageously taking great risks and making sacrifices. Concerns that soldiers’ fighting spirit would be dampened in the TikTok and coronavirus generation have been dispelled.

Given that, it would be better if the media did not adopt a stance more suitable for cheerleaders. The prolonging of the war is accompanied by numerous difficulties. This is one reason the IDF General Staff has been in favor of the transition into phase three of the war plan, which involves the demobilization of a substantial portion of reserve units and the thinning of the roster of forces operating within the Gaza Strip.

Earlier in the week, offensive operations of Division 36 in the central Gaza Strip ended, for now. Brigade-size combat teams that operated under it, in a limited format, left the Strip for a period of rest and reorganization, with a possibility that these teams will be required to move to the border with Lebanon.

Reserve forces deployed in the north have also been there for over three months, ever since the war broke out, and soldiers there will be happy to be replaced. Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi wanted to take Division 36 out of Gaza earlier, but its evacuation took a long time – up to a point at which there were suspicions in the General Staff that field commanders were deliberately slowing the carrying out of orders.

Part of the problem stems from the difficulties in defining the mission. In most Gaza Strip arenas where the IDF is operating, fighting is less intense at this point. The forces are busy locating tunnels and armaments, here and there encountering Hamas terrorists.

The main threats are posed by small squads emerging from underground and attacking with sniper fire or rocket-propelled grenades, or planting explosive devices – two days ago, two reservists were killed by a rocket.

In Khan Yunis, where most of the forces are concentrated, under Division 98, the main activity consists of trying to reach senior Hamas leaders inside the tunnels and identify locations where hostages are being held.

The message projected by the IDF and the politicians is that commanders and soldiers completely identify with the just cause of this war – which is largely true – and that all of them are willing to continue for as long as is necessary, which is much less accurate.

In practice, there is a gradual erosion, apparently natural, with regard to the nature of missions. Some of the brigade teams in Khan Yunis are dealing with more secondary missions which are being carried out more slowly, while division commanders are focused on a battle of the minds with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

The number of incidents is relatively low, and the burden on reservists in particular is growing heavier, given the demands on their lives as civilians, which came to a halt early in October.

In reserve paratrooper brigade 55, there was a letter sent by combatants to their company commander, in which they asked to remain in Gaza until victory was achieved. But in other companies and battalions in that brigade, there is a different atmosphere, with many soldiers believing that they have done their duty well, but that there is no longer any justification for leaving them for more than 100 consecutive days in Gaza.

The anticipated burden in the coming year, with soldiers being told that they can expect to be called up for additional, prolonged reserve duty in its course, is the focus of their concern. Despite the excitement and volunteer spirit they’ve demonstrated since the war broke out, there are also quiet cases of soldiers taking their own leave, not returning from furloughs to their units in Gaza, based on a variety of reasons.

The frustration is augmented by a sense that the burden is not shared equally. This is not just about the glaring injustice of the sweeping exemption given to ultra-Orthodox young men; the excitement over Haredi volunteers at the beginning of the war turned out, as expected, to revolve around a very small phenomenon that was inflated for public relations purposes.

Over the last decade, the IDF has significantly cut down its reserve forces. There are also problems with manpower allocations, with reservists falling through the cracks as they are transferred from unit to unit or when reassigned after lengthy stays overseas. The result is that the army is not efficiently utilizing the reserve pool at its disposal.

There is also a sense of gross inequality among people who do show up for reserve duty. To their credit, there are many reservists who had received an exemption but who volunteered for duty on October 7.

The problems are different in conscript army units, revolving mainly around the exorbitant toughness exhibited by some commanders regarding furloughs, refreshment periods outside the Gaza Strip or in IDF bases, and even with regard to the very loose connection with soldiers’ parents.

In December, Haaretz reported that parents of soldiers in the conscript paratroop brigade were angry that this brigade afforded less contact between soldiers and parents compared to other brigades. Here too, the General Staff had to intervene and smooth ruffled feathers.

But these phenomena have repeated themselves in recent weeks, in some paratroop battalions and in the commando brigade. Concerned parents don’t receive regular information, with almost no phone contact with the soldiers – even indirectly, through their units. There have also not been any leaves. The most that soldiers received were some periods of rest.

As noted, the difficulty in contending with Hamas is clear, as is the burden of missions which oblige commanders to pose tough demands on their soldiers. However, it seems that commanders on the ground, and the ones supposed to supervise them from above, have not yet realized that this is a marathon, not a sprint.

This requires more meticulous planning, room for flexibility in sending forces on missions by the General Staff’s operations branch, and some attention paid to the combatants – and people providing them with support – who are carrying the burden and facing the risks. The IDF’s and the state’s steadfastness depends on this too. One cannot guarantee steadfastness over the long haul merely with lofty words about love of country.

The Houthi black swan

[The neocolony] recently lowered its public profile regarding anything associated with the Houthi threat from Yemen. The number of attempts by the Houthis to hit Eilat has diminished somewhat, with their efforts in recent weeks focused mainly on disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea, on the pretext of their identification with residents of Gaza who are facing [neocolonial] attacks.

The numerous Houthi attacks on vessels, using ballistic missiles, land-to-sea missiles and drones, are completely disrupting the use of one of the most important maritime routes in the world, which shortens the distance between Asia and Europe by using the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Iran is not only encouraging the Houthis and supplying them with abundant weapons, it is apparently also providing them with intelligence regarding traffic through the area.

Officially, the Houthis claim that they are hitting only vessels owned by [neocolonists] or ones heading from or to [the neocolony]. In practice, many vessels with no connection to [the neocolony] have been hit as well.

The international coalition cobbled together by the U.S. is not making do with protecting vessels, but this week initiated airstrikes on Houthi bases and armaments.

Even though [the neocolony] has sustained diplomatic and economic damage from these attacks, it appears that [its] leaders have chosen to limit their statements regarding this issue, striving to limit [Zionism’s] public involvement in the confrontation.

Ami Daniel, the CEO and founder of the [neocolonial] company Windward, specializes in surveillance of maritime traffic. He told Haaretz that the Houthi attacks have led to a new situation, “like a black swan incident that pops up suddenly, one that no one had predicted.”

Daniel says that the practical significance of these events for [neocolonialism] is “the creation of a situation in which quiet sanctions are imposed on [Zionism], with significantly higher costs of importing and exporting, with some companies preferring not to do business with us due to the risks involved.”

Already last December, Daniel adds, there was a drop of tens of percentage points in the maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an almost total cessation of trade through the port of Eilat. It’s likely that many months will pass before traffic to Eilat resumes.

With regard to the Suez Canal, which brings Egypt revenues of $9.5 billion a year, there is an anticipated 50 percent drop in this income. Given the high costs of insurance for vessels that go through the Red Sea, many companies prefer the longer route around Africa and through the Straits of Gibraltar, paying more for fuel and wages for crew members. This will partly be rolled onward to end consumers.

Daniel says the crisis in the Red Sea is already impacting chains of production and supply, which weren’t in great shape to begin with.

Various companies, including car manufacturers Tesla, Volvo and Suzuki, have already announced delays in the supply of their products due to problems in supplies of raw material stemming from the Houthi attacks. The price of oil is also expected to rise soon due to the crisis.

(Emphasis original. Credits to Mondoweiss for showing us this.)