From David Bohm in Chance and Causality

Now, as we shall see in this chapter and in other parts of the book, the mechanistic philosophy has taken many specific forms throughout the development of science. The most essential aspects of this philosophy seem to the author, however, to be its assumption that the great diversity of things that appear in all of our experience, every day as well as scientific, can all be reduced completely and perfectly to nothing more than consequences of the operation of an absolute and final set of purely quantitative laws determining the behaviour of a few kinds of basic entities or variables. (p. 37)

But we do not assume, as is generally done in a mechanistic philosophy, that the whole of nature can eventually be treated completely perfectly and unconditionally in terms of just one of these sides, so that the other will be seen to be inessential, a mere shadow, that makes no fundamental contribution to our representation of nature as a whole. (p. 143)

There’s plenty of space to reinterpret free-will (or concretized moments of free-will recognized or experienced by humans, if you’d like) into this representation of nature as wholly infinite and constantly developing.

If you scrap the indeterminism = free-will assumption, you can interpret this way:

• determinism and no free-will.
• indeterminism but genes + environment/structure govern everything, so free-will illusion.
• indeterminism and genes + environment/structure impact culture and cultural learning, but meaning and content delivered through understanding and cognition is still an experience and hence uniquely free to interpret and reinterpret itself, leaving room for some freedom of the will.