Yea, i remember you saying that, and i remember tlling you you’re conflating two things that shouldn’t be.
Then you doubled down on your ignorance about “indirect” harm, which leads me to believe you DIDN’T read the ruling in this case that i even pasted for you, so you didn’t have to do ANY work but reading… Which again, you chose not to do.
LET ME HELP YOU FURTHER:
At least Missouri has standing to challenge the Secretary’s pro-
gram. Article III requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in
fact—a concrete and imminent harm to a legally protected interest,
like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
duct and likely to be redressed by the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. Here, as the Government concedes,
the Secretary’s plan would cost MOHELA, a nonprofit government cor-
poration created by Missouri to participate in the student loan market,
an estimated $44 million a year in fees.
MOHELA is, by law and func-
tion, an instrumentality of Missouri: Labeled an “instrumentality” by
the State, it was created by the State, is supervised by the State, and
serves a public function. The harm to MOHELA in the performance of
its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself. The
Court reached a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas v. Texas,
346 U. S. 368.
The Secretary emphasizes that, as a public corporation, MOHELA
has a legal personality separate from the State. But such an instru-
mentality—created and supervised by the State to serve a public func-
tion—remains “(for many purposes at least) part of the Government
itself.” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S.
374, 397. The Secretary also contends that because MOHELA can sue
on its own behalf, it—not Missouri—must be the one to sue. But where
a State has been harmed in carrying out its responsibilities, the fact
that it chose to exercise its authority through a public corporation it
created and controls does not bar the State from suing to remedy that
harm itself. See Arkansas, 346 U. S. 368. With Article III satisfied,
the Court need not consider the States’ other standing arguments.
Can you read? I bolded the important part that explains the DIRECT harm.
And yes, i agree. Our education system IS failing us. You’re exhibit A.
Yea, i remember you saying that, and i remember tlling you you’re conflating two things that shouldn’t be.
Then you doubled down on your ignorance about “indirect” harm, which leads me to believe you DIDN’T read the ruling in this case that i even pasted for you, so you didn’t have to do ANY work but reading… Which again, you chose not to do.
LET ME HELP YOU FURTHER:
MOHELA is, by law and func- tion, an instrumentality of Missouri: Labeled an “instrumentality” by the State, it was created by the State, is supervised by the State, and serves a public function. The harm to MOHELA in the performance of its public function is necessarily a direct injury to Missouri itself. The Court reached a similar conclusion 70 years ago in Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U. S. 368.
The Secretary emphasizes that, as a public corporation, MOHELA has a legal personality separate from the State. But such an instru- mentality—created and supervised by the State to serve a public func- tion—remains “(for many purposes at least) part of the Government itself.” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 397. The Secretary also contends that because MOHELA can sue on its own behalf, it—not Missouri—must be the one to sue. But where a State has been harmed in carrying out its responsibilities, the fact that it chose to exercise its authority through a public corporation it created and controls does not bar the State from suing to remedy that harm itself. See Arkansas, 346 U. S. 368. With Article III satisfied, the Court need not consider the States’ other standing arguments.
Can you read? I bolded the important part that explains the DIRECT harm.
And yes, i agree. Our education system IS failing us. You’re exhibit A.