Here’s the way I think of it. Imagine you live in a house at the end of a long street. Your front door is the login page to your Synology. All the measures you’ve put in place (cloudlfare, ip blocklists, firewall) are the equivalent of putting up a guard booth/gate at the end of your driveway that only allows cars with a license plate of a specific state.
You haven’t made yourself significantly more secure, just lined the traffic up in a more organized fashion. You are still trusting the people that made your door lock to not be vulnerable.
Yes, it’s easier to access vs having a big metal gate that only you have the code to open (VPN) in front of your house. But why open yourself up to a single point of failure?
Here’s just one recent example of an attacker being able to bypass the authentication on a synology. All the things you have implemented wouldn’t prevent a single person in the internet from using this exploit. https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-660/
Here’s the way I think of it. Imagine you live in a house at the end of a long street. Your front door is the login page to your Synology. All the measures you’ve put in place (cloudlfare, ip blocklists, firewall) are the equivalent of putting up a guard booth/gate at the end of your driveway that only allows cars with a license plate of a specific state.
You haven’t made yourself significantly more secure, just lined the traffic up in a more organized fashion. You are still trusting the people that made your door lock to not be vulnerable.
Yes, it’s easier to access vs having a big metal gate that only you have the code to open (VPN) in front of your house. But why open yourself up to a single point of failure?
Here’s just one recent example of an attacker being able to bypass the authentication on a synology. All the things you have implemented wouldn’t prevent a single person in the internet from using this exploit. https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-660/